Literatur

Literatur zum Thema «Wissenschaftstheorie»

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(Alphabetisch nach Autorennamen sortiert)

A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   K   L   M   N   P   R   S   T   V   W  

A

Adams, E. W. (1959). The Foundations of Rigid Body Mechanics and the Derivation of its Laws from Those of Particle Mechanics, in (Henkin, Suppes, Tarski, 1959), Amsterdam, 250–265.
Andreas, H. (2010). A Modal View of the Semantics of Theoretical Sentences. Synthese, 174 (3), 367–383.
Andreas, H. (2010). New Account of Empirical Claims in Structuralism. Synthese, 176 (3), 311–332.
Andreas, H. (2011). A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 20(2), 205–232.
Andreas, H. (2013). Deductive Reasoning in the Structuralist Approach. Studia Logica, 101(5), 1093–1113.
Andreas, H. (2014). Carnapian Structuralism. Erkenntnis, 79(SB), 1373–1391.

B

Balzer, W. (1979). On the Status of Arithmetic. Erkenntnis, 14(1), 57–85.
Balzer, W. (1982). Finality and the Development of Logical Structures of Physical Theories. Epistemologia, 5, 257–268.
Balzer, W. (1982). Empirische Theorien: Modelle, Strukturen, Beispiele. Vieweg, Braunschweig.
Balzer, W. (1985). Incommensurability, Reduction, and Translation. Erkenntnis, 23(3), 255–267.
Balzer, W. (1986). Theoretical Terms, A New Perspective. Journal of Philosophy, 83(2), 71–90.
Balzer, W., Lauth. B., Zoubek, G. (1993). A Model for Science Kinematics. Studia Logical, 52(4), 519–548.
Balzer, W., Moulines, C. U. (eds.) (1996). Structuralist Theory of Science: Focal Issues, New Results. de Gruyter, Berlin – New York.
Balzer, W., Pearce, D. A., Schmidt, H.-J. (1984). Reduction in Science: Structure, Examples, Philosophical Problems. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Balzer, W., Sneed, J. D., Moulines, C. U. (2000). Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples. Rodopi, Amsterdam.
Balzer, W., Zoubek, G. (1994). Structuralist Aspects of Idealization, in M. Kuokkanen (ed.) Idealization VII: Structuralism, Idealization and Approximation, Poznan Studies 42, 57–79.
Bartelborth, T. (1988). Eine logische Rekonstruktion der klassischen Elektrodynamik. Peter Lang, Frankfurt.
Bartelborth, T. (1996). Scientific Explanation, in (Balzer & Moulines, 1996).  23–43.
Bartelborth, T. (1996). Hierarchy versus Holism. A Structuralist View of General Relativity. Erkenntnis, 39(3), 383–412.
Bartelborth, T. (1999). Coherence and Explanation. Erkenntnis, 50(2/3), 209–224.
Bartelborth, T. (1999). Verstehen und Kohärenz. Ein Beitrag zur Methodologie der Sozialwissenschaften. Analyse und Kritik, 21(1), 97–116.
Bickle, J. (1998). Psychoneural Reduction. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Brecher, M., Wilkenfeld, J., Moser, S. (eds.) (1988). Crisis in the Twentieth Century. Zwei Bände, Oxford – New York.
Burscheid, H. J. & Struve, H. (2000). The Theory of Stochastic Fairness – its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification, in (Balzer, Sneed, Moulines, 2000), 69 – 98.
Burscheid, H. J. & Struve, H. (2001). Die Differentialrechnung nach Leibniz – eine Rekonstruktion, Studia Leibnitiana 33, 163 – 93.
Burscheid, H. J. & Struve, H. (2010). Mathmatikdidaktik in Rekonstruktionen. Berlin.

C

Carnap, R. (1960). Philosophical Foundations of Physics. New York.
Carnap, R. 1998 (1928): Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Hamburg, Felix Meiner.
Cartwright, N. (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Causey R. L. (1972). Uniform Microreductions. Synthese 25(1-2), 176 -218.

D

Dalla Chiara, M. L. (1997). Structures and Norms in Science. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Darden, L. & Maull, N. L. (1977). Interfield Theories, Philosophy of Science 44, 43 – 64.
Day, M. (1985). Adams on Theoretical Reduction. Erkenntnis, 23(2), 161–184.
De Bellis, N. (2009). Bibliometrics and Citation Analysis: From the Science Citation Index to Cybermetrics. Lanham, Scarerow Press.
Diederich, W. (1996). Pragmatic and Diachronic Aspects of Structuralism, in (Balzer & Moulines, 1996), 75–82.
Diederich, W. (1996). Structuralism as Developed within the Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science, in (Balzer & Moulines, 1996), 15–21.
Diez, J. A. (2002). A Program for the Individuation of Scientific Concepts. Synthese, 130(1), 13–48.

E

Eom, S. B. (2009). Author Cocitation Analysis: Quantitative Methods for Mapping the Intellectual Structure of an Academic Discipline. Hershey.

F

Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against Method. New Left Books, London.
Field, H. (1980). Science Without Numbers. Blackwell, Oxford.
Forge, J. (1999). Explanation, Quantity and Law. MacMillan, New York.
Friedman, M. (1974). Explanation and Scientific Understanding, Journal of Philosophy 71, 395–419.

G

Gähde, U. (1990). On Innertheoretical Conditions for Theoretical Terms. Erkenntnis 32, 215–233.
Gähde, U. (1996). Holism and the Empirical Claim of Theory-Nets, in: (Balzer & Moulines, 1996), 167–190.
Gähde, U. (1997). Anomalies and the Revision of Theory-Elements: Notes on the Advance of Mercury’s Perihelion, in: (Dalla Chiara, 1997). 89–104.
Gähde, U. (2002). Holism, Underdetermination, and the Dynamics of Empirical Theories. Synthese, 130(1), 69–90.
Gähde, U. (2014). Theory-Dependent Determination of Base Sets: Implications for the Structuralist Approach. Erkenntnis, 79(SB), 1459–1473.
Gärdenfors, P. (1988). Knowledge in Flux. Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
Glymour, C. (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton Univeristy Press.

H

Hanson, N. R. (1971). Observation and Explanation. Harper and Row, London.
Hartmann, S. (1995). Models as a Tool for the Theory Construction; Some Strategies of Preliminary Physics, in Herfel, W. E. etc. (eds.) Theories and Models in Scientific Processes, Rodopi, Atlanta, 49–67.
Heinrich, W. (1998). Inexakte Messung und Datenkinematik. Eine wissenschaftliche Untersuchung. Frankfurt am Main [u.a.], Peter Lang.
Henkin, L., Suppes, P. & Tarski, A. (eds.) (1959). The Axiomatic Method. Amsterdam, North-Holland.
Hitchcock, C. R. (1996). The Role of Contrast in Causal and Explanatory Claims. Synthese, 107(3), 395–419.
Hitchcock, C. R. (1999). Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of Determinism. British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 50(4), 585–612.
Hinst, P. (1996): A Rigorous Set Theoretical Foundations of the Structuralist Approach, in (Balzer & Moulines, 1996), 233–263. Hoering, W. (1984). Anomalies of Reduction, in (Balzer, Pearce, Schmidt, 1984), 33–50.

K

Kitcher, P. 1976: Explanation, Conjunction and Unification. Journal of Philosophy, 73(8), 207–212.
Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1990). Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation, in Savage, C. W. (ed.), Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 298–318.

L

Lakatos, I. (1978). The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Laudan, L. (1977) Progress and its Problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Laudan, L. (1991). Theory Evolution and Reference Kinematics, Synthese 88, 279–307.
Lauth, B. (2002). Transtheoretical Structures and Deterministic Models. Synthese, 130(1), 163–172.
Lewis, D. (1970). How to Define Theoretical Terms, in Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 78–95.
Lipton, P. (1991). Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge, London.

M

Mayr, D. (1976). Investigations of the Concept of Reduction I. Erkenntnis, 10(3), 275–294.
Medin, D. L. (1989). Concepts and Conceptual Structure. The American Psychologist, 44(12), 1469–1481.
Mormann, T. (1988). Structuralist Reduction Concepts as Structure-Preserving Maps. Synthese, 77(2), 215–250.
Moulines, C. U. (1979). Theory-Nets and the Evolution of Theories: The Example of Newtonian Mechanics. Synthese, 41(3), 417–439.
Moulines, C. U. (1984) Ontological Reduction in the Natural Sciences, in (Balzer, Pearce, Schmidt, 1984), 51–70.
Moulines, C. U. (1991). Pragmatics in the Structuralist View of Science, in Schurz, G. & Dorn, G. J. W. (eds.) Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 313–326.
Moulines, C. U. (2006). Ontology, Reduction, Emergence: A General Frame. Synthese, 151(3), 313–323.
Moulines, C. U. & Diez, J. A. (1994). Theories as Nets: Combinatorial Measurement Theory, in Humphreys, P. (ed.) Patrick Suppes, Mathematical Philosopher. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 275–297.
Moulines, C.U. (1996). Bridges, Constraints, and Links, in: (Balzer & Moulines, 1996), 219–232.
Murphy, G. L. (2000). Explanatory Concepts, in Keil, F.C. & Wilson, R. A. (eds.), Explanation and Cognition. MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 361–392.
Murphy, G. L. & Medin, D. L. 1985: The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence, Psychological Review 92, 289–316.

N

Nagel, E. (1979). The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logics of Scientific Explanations. Hackett Publ. Comp., Cambridge.
Niebergall, K.-G. (2000). On the Logic of Reducibility: Axioms and Examples, Erkenntnis 53, 27–61.
Niebergall, K.-G. (2002). Structuralism, Model Theory and Reduction. Synthese, 130(1), 135–162.

P

Pearce, D. (1981). Is there any Theoretical Justification for a Nonstatement View of Theories. Synthese, 46(1), 1–39.
Pearce, D. (1981). Comments on a Criterion of Theoreticity. Synthese, 48(1), 77–86.
Pearce, D. (1981). Some Relations between Empirical Systems, Epistemologie IV, 363–380.
Pearce, D. (1982). Stegmüller on Kuhn and Incommensurability. British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 33(4), 389–396.
Pearce, D. (1982). Logical Properties of the Structuralist Concept of Reduction, Erkenntnis 18, 307–333.
Pearce, D. (1985). Translation, Reduction and Equivalence. Peter Lang, Frankfurt.
Pearce, D. & Rantala, V. (1985). Continuity and Scientific discovery, Communication and Cognition 18, 15–23.
Pearce, D. & Rantala, V. (1983). New Foundations for Metascience, Synthese 56(1), 1–26.
Pearce, D. & Rantala, V. (1984). Scientific Change, Continuity, and Problem Solving, Philosophia Naturalis 21, 389–399.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A Study of Concepts. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Peris-Vine, L. M. (2011) Actual Models of the Chomsky Grammar, Metatheoria 1, 195–225.
Przelewski, M. (1969). The Logical of Empirical Theories. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, in Putnam, H. Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge University Press, New York, 215–271.

R

Rantala, V. (1978). The Old and the New Logic of Metascience. Synthese, 39(2), 233–247.
Rantala, V. (1980). On the Logical Basis of the Structuralist Philosophy of Science. Erkenntnis, 15(3), 269–286.
Rantala, V. (1991). Review of: W. Balzer, C. U. Moulines, and J . D. Sneed, An Architectonic for Science, Synthese 86, 297–319.
Roseveare, N. T. (1982). Mercury’s Perihelion. From the Verrier to Einstein. Clarendon, Oxford.

S

Salmon, W. C. (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: University Press.
Schaffner, K. F. (1967). Approaches to Reduction. Philosophy of Science, 34(2), 137–147.
Solla Price, D. J. de (1965). Networks of Scientific Papers. Science 149(3683), 510–515.
Scheibe, E. (1973). Die Erklärung der Keplerschen Gesetze durch Newtons Gravitationsgesetz, in: (Scheibe & Süßmann, 1973), 98–118.
Scheibe, E. & Süßmann, G. (Hrsg.) (1973). Einheit und Vielheit, Festschrift für C. F. v. Weizsäcker, Göttingen, Vandenhoek und Ruprecht.
Schurz, G., Weingartner, P. (eds.) (1998). Koexistenz rivalisierender Paradigmen: Eine post-kuhnsche Bestandsaufnahme zur Struktur gegenwärtiger Wissenschaft. Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag.
Sneed, J. D. (1971). The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Sneed, J. D. (1994) Structural Explanation, in Humphreys (ed.) Patrick Suppes: Mathematical Philosopher. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Shapiro, S. (1991) Foundations without Foundationalism. A Case for Second-Order Logic. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Stegmüller, W. (1976). The Structure and Dynamics of Theories. Springer, New York.
Stegmüller, W. (1979). The Structuralist View of Theories. Berlin [u.a.]: Springer.
Struve, H., Müller-Hill, E., Witzke, I. (2015). Berkeleys Kritik am Leibniz’schen Calculus, Journal of General Philosophy of Science, online.
Suppe, F. (1972). Theories, their Formulations and the Operative Imperative, Synthese 25, 129–159.
Suppes, P. (1956). Introduction to Logic. van Nostrand, Princeton NJ.
Suppes, P. (1960). A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences, Synthese 12, 287–300.
Suppes, P. (1962). Models of Data, in Nagel, E., Suppes, P., Tarski, A. (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
Suppes, P. (1969). Studies in Methodology and Foundations of Science. Dordrecht, Reidel.
Suppes, P. (1974). The Structure of Theories and the Analysis of Data, in Suppe, F. (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 266–283.

T

Tuomela, R. (1972). Model Theory and Empirical Interpretation of Scientific Theories, Synthese 25, 165–175.

V

van Benthem, J. & Pearce, D. (1984). A Mathematical Characterization of Interpretation between Theories, Studia Logical 43(3), 295–303.
van Fraassen, B. (1967). Meaning Relations and Predicates, Nous 1, 161–179.
van Fraassen, B. (1969). Meaning Relations and Predicates, Nous 3, 155-167.
van Fraassen, B. (1972). A Formal Approach to the Philosophy of Science, in Colodny, R. (ed.), Paradigms and Paradoxes: The Challenge of the Quantum Domain, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh, 303–366.
van Fraassen, B. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford, Clarendon.
van Fraassen, B. (1989). Laws and Symmetry. Hutchinson, London.

W

Westmeyer, H. (1989). Psychological Theories from a Structuralist Point of View. Berlin.
Wojcicki, R. (1974). Set Theoretic Representations of Empirical Phenomena. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3(3), 337–343.
Woodward, J. (1997). Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention. Philosophy of Science, 64, 26–41.
Woodward, J. (2000). Explanation and Invarianz in the Special Sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51(2), 197–254.
Worrall, J. (1984). An Unreal Image: Review of van Fraassen (1980). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35(1), 65–80.